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Derrick Bell*
Education must begin with the solution of the teacher-student contradic-
tion, by reconciling the poles of the contradiction so that both are
simultaneously teachers and students.
Paulo Freire'
I. THE CHALLENGE IN TEACHING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In Hopwood v. Texas, a panel of the Fifth Circuit found that
considering race or ethnicity in admissions decisions is always
unconstitutional, even when intended to combat perceived effects of a
hostile environment, or to remedy past discrimination, or to promote
diversity.2 In effect, the court of appeals ignored the Supreme Court's
Bakke3 decision approving the use of race in admissions to promote
diversity.4 In an article commenting on the Hopwood case, retired
Court of Appeals Judge, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., noted that the
three judges who ruled were all appointed by Presidents Reagan and
Bush, and that all nine judges who rejected the petition for a rehearing
en banc were appointed by Reagan and Bush, while six of the seven
judges who voted for rehearing were Carter and Clinton appointees.
5
The Hopwood decision was far from the first time that politics and
ideology heavily influenced the decision in a case involving constitu-
tional rights. Indeed, a strong argument can be made that a great
* Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law.
1. PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 59 (Continuum ed. 1989).
2. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc'y v. Hopwood,
116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
3. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. See generally Hopwood, 78 F.3d 932.
S. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Breaking Thurgood Marshall's Promise, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 28.
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many decisions are so influenced, despite the ever-lengthening opinions
seeking to justify results by interpreting constitutional provisions and
their doctrinal progeny.
The challenge in teaching Constitutional Law is to teach the
doctrine while puncturing the myths. It is not an easy task. Ameri-
cans treat the Constitution as a hallowed document created by men so
divinely inspired that the document they produced in 1787 has been
amended less than three dozen times. They might add that because of
a number of factors, including those amendments, there are now only
about 300 operative words in the Constitution, and that most litigation
has centered about the meaning of a dozen or so terms: "due process,"
"cruel and unusual punishment," "commerce," "free exercise,"
"commander- in-chief, " "free speech," and "equal protection."
Whether or not intended by the Framers, these phrases have been
rendered abstract, inscrutable, and ultimately indeterminate by
generations of conflicting judicial interpretation.
Quite literally, the Constitution means what any particular
Supreme Court or, more accurately, the majority of a particular Court,
decides that it means. "Meaning" in its constitutional sense, though,
is seldom a matter of personal whim or ideological eccentricity. The
Court is moved by a myriad of factors, often in quite rational though
hard to predict directions. Gaining a sense of those movements and
their motivations is an essential skill for the constitutional law
advocate. It is a skill more easily described than acquired.
During my close to four decades as lawyer and law teacher, I have
witnessed changes in constitutional law that defy even the most skilled
efforts to explain or harmonize as neutral, objective, interpretations of
the Constitutional text. For example, as a law student in the mid-
1950s, I learned that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted to provide the former slaves with all the
indicia of citizenship as a means of protecting them from invidious
discrimination from the vanquished but still vengeful whites in the
Southern states. I learned, as well, that after the Reconstruction
period, the nation's interest turned to growth and away from the earlier
commitment to the now free but still vulnerable former slaves. The
protective potential of the Clause was diluted by restrictive decisions,
and for the better part of the next century, it was utilized to nurture
"railroads, utility companies, banks, employers of child labor, chain
stores, money lenders, aliens, and a host of other groups and institu-
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tions ... , leaving so little room for the Negro that he seemed to be
the fourteenth amendment's forgotten man."
6
In the wake of economic reforms required by the Great Depres-
sion and a more egalitarian outlook prompted by the nation's victory
in World War II, the Supreme Court's view of the Fourteenth
Amendment refocused on its original purpose. The "strict scrutiny"
standard in equal protection analysis became the great safeguard of
"discrete and insular minorities" against majoritarian hostility. In the
last decade, the Court has again weakened the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's shield by applying the strictures of strict scrutiny to the most
modest efforts to remedy generations of racial discrimination, much of
it continuing in more subtle forms. The right of individuals to enjoy
privacy in the areas of sex and family life free from state interfer-
ence-a long struggle-culminated with the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion of a limited right to abortion.7 That right continues to exist
despite a generation of attacks, but in very diluted form. The First
Amendment's "free exercise" clause, so often in tension with the "no
establishment" clause, has produced conflicting decisions that can
charitably be described as a series of ad hoc results adhering closely to
the facts of each case and providing little of precedential value for even
experts attempting to explain or predict the law in this muddled field.
Nor is the confusion limited to the individual rights area. The
Tenth Amendment, only recently laid to rest as an impossible measure
of what, if any, limits the Constitution imposes on the federal
government's policies that interfere with basic state functioning, has
evidently been given a new life.8 And, on their part, it is far from
clear whether the states in this modern, complex and increasingly
interrelated age, can still legitimately engage in functions that interfere
with the policies or interests of other states without running afoul of
the Commerce Clause. Must we await a modem-day Solomon to
distinguish the ever-more complicated relationships between the
Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of the federal govern-
ment?
These questions, only a sampling of those that assert themselves
after even a cursory survey of current precedent, raise a more troubling
question for the law school course. How does one teach materials that
seem to fit so comfortably into the Critical Legal Studies critique of
6. Boris I. Bittker, The Case of the Checkerboard Ordinance: An Experiment in Race
Relations, 71 YALE L. REV. 1387, 1393 (1962).
7. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
8. See, e.g., Lopez v. U.S., 514 U.S. 540 (1995).
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law? As interpreted by Professor Stanley Fish, judicial decision-
making is not
a formal mechanism for determining outcomes in a neutral fashion
as traditional legal scholars maintain-but is rather a ramshackle ad
hoc affair whose ill-fitting joints are soldered together by suspect
rhetorical gestures, leaps of illogic, and special pleading tricked up
as general rules, all in the service of a decidedly partisan agenda that
wants to wrap itself in the mantle and majesty of THE law.9
But the challenge of law teaching, and the particular challenge of
Constitutional Law, is less to harmonize the inherently dissonant, than
to convey to students an understanding of the wide-ranging economic,
social, and political influences that play a mostly unacknowledged but
substantial role in constitutional decision-making. We know that the
Framers who gathered in Philadelphia were moved by the political
theories of John Locke and Montesquieu, but their presence was
mandated by concern that their property as well as their liberty,
threatened under the unworkable Articles of Confederation, might be
placed at even greater risk under a strong, central government.
They were, as Charles Beard reminds us in his classic 1913 study,
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, men
of wealth with investments in land, slaves, manufacturing, and
shipping.1" The Constitution they adopted served their primary
interests.11  It created a strong federal government that balanced
authority with the states.12 By recognizing specific rights in the
individual, the Constitution enabled the wealthy a measure of
protection against both government and uprisings by dissident groups
of citizens as had happened the year before in Shay's Rebellion. The
wealthy continue to enjoy influence in government policy-making
based on that wealth rather than on either their numbers or the
wisdom and worth of the policies they support. And yet, precisely
because they lack wealth and influence, the poor and working classes,
minorities and those with unpopular views, beliefs, or causes look to
the Constitution as the primary source of protection, fairness, and
9. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S No SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH... AND IT'S A GOOD
THING Too 21 (1994).
10. CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES, 149-51 (1929). See generally Pope McCorkle, The Historian as Intellectual:
Charles Beard and the Constitution Reconsidered, 28 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 314 (1984) (reviewing
the criticism of Beard's work and finding validity in his thesis that the Framers primarily sought
to advance the property interests of the wealthy).
11. BEARD, supra note 10, at 151.
12. Id. at 159-63.
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reform. Whether such efforts can bring about substantive, as opposed
to merely symbolic, improvement for the disadvantaged and a measure
of equality for long-time victims of discrimination, is a question that
can be raised again and again throughout the course.
II. MEETING THE CHALLENGE
The starting point for the teaching of any law course is, I believe,
to identify the pedagogical goal: what should each student who enters
a particular course of study retain long after completing the course?
What should that student understand, have accomplished, be able to
do, and have made his or her "own" from that class? Long after
completing their legal education, today's students, who will be
tomorrow's lawyers, should of course retain key concepts of constitu-
tional law as they inform every lawyer's practice, and an understanding
of the framework of the structure of government. More importantly,
each student should understand that Supreme Court decisions are
particular to specific periods, with broad factual settings that really
include all of society. The singular and key understanding at which I
would hope every student arrives is that rather than a revered relic
bequeathed by the Founding Fathers, to be kept under glass and
occasionally dusted, the Constitution is a living document, one locus
of battle over the shape of our society, where differing visions of what
should be, compete to become what is, and what will be.
More than in other areas of the law, constitutional law requires
that provisions and precedents be used as aids in decision-making, not
directives. Understanding in this area is furthered by actually working
with the materials, rather than simply discussing them in the abstract
or examining how the Court has used them over time. This is not
easy given the continuing commitment to the passive classroom, a vice
to which almost all law schools seem passionately committed, and
despite the move to make clinical courses available, in most law schools
they are limited in duration to a single course or year, and are not
necessarily available to every student wishing to enroll in them. The
subject-range of full-fledged clinical courses is typically constrained as
well. Most tellingly, the core courses of the traditional legal curricu-
lum are rarely if ever taught via a participatory, or experiential,
methodology. Moot Court is not a universal requirement, and thus
learning-by-doing is an oddity. Students scarcely are permitted to
spend the majority of their classroom time debating contested issues of
law, in Constitutional Law or any other area. If never required to use
the concepts they encounter, the course material passes by like scenery
through an airplane window: remote and inaccessible. Thus students
1998] 1043
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seldom experience the fierce energies of these controversies, even
though the embalmed results of such contests are the exact subject
matter of their readings. When teaching methods reverse the relative
weights of the traditions of legal pedagogy, the available texts, with
their common problems, tend to make only the most approximate of
"fits" with a participatory structure for Constitutional Law. The
traditional casebook quietly encourages the repetition of the traditional
lecture course by assuming that the classroom will be run on the
passive model: it is not structured to support a participatory course,
making it difficult for the professor to organize one, and difficult for
the student to learn by doing or, better, by teaching.
Over the years, I have found that student interest and learning is
enhanced if they are actively engaged in the learning and teaching
process. An analogy to driving a car, or riding a bicycle, may not be
exact, but as with skills requiring coordination of many faculties,
understanding, much less advocacy of constitutional issues, is
facilitated greatly by practice. Student understanding of the precedents
and, more importantly, the economic and political pressures that
underlie the ebb and flow of doctrine increase when they utilize these
precedents to support arguments they are making as advocates in front
of their peers, or when, as justices, they seek to find flaws in those
arguments. While the cases they argue and decide are hypothetical,
they provide effective training for those who will become advocates
tomorrow.
The design of Constitutional Law, as I teach it, is the antithesis
of the traditional inculcation of "passivity as the norm" so common in
legal education. In my experience and as my students frequently
have told me-students do vastly more work, and learn more from, an
engaged teaching methodology, one which requires that they perform
very much like the lawyers they will soon become. The demands on
individual students mimic, in many ways, the world of practice, and
require that they assume substantial personal responsibility for their
professional education. Law students gracefully rise to the challenge
and meet it with a competence that might surprise some educators.
By departing from the norm in constitutional casebooks and giving
priority to "learning by doing" simulations, students mimic the kind
of process that an attorney, researching an unfamiliar area of law,
might utilize to investigate prior decisions. In practice, lawyers are
called to research and to write; to comprehend legal arguments; to
guess at the probable effect of and interaction between judicial,
statutory, legal and policy arguments in court; to argue, persuade and
debate; to work cooperatively with colleagues; and for some, to judge
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those arguments and decide cases and issues of law. This is as true in
the practice of constitutional law as in any other. Once their research
skills are in place, most students are aware that they have the capacity
to learn, relatively quickly, whatever they need or want to know
regarding any legal question.
To this end, I have organized my courses so as to involve
maximum feasible student participation. This was difficult during the
many years when I used one or another of the existing constitutional
law casebooks designed for courses where the teacher, using methods
of lecture and discussion, would lead the class through the labyrinth of
edited opinions and writings toward the end-of-term final exam.
Opening typically with Marbury v. Madison introducing judicial review
in greater or lesser detail, these texts proceed to examine national
powers, commencing with the commerce power and continuing with
the enumerated powers of Congress, the powers of the other branches
of government and the separation of powers. Newer efforts begin the
text with recent and controversial cases, seeking to stimulate students'
attention early in the course, which is then presumed to continue at a
high level thereafter. The existing texts, which from one viewpoint
differ considerably in the number of major cases covered, order of
presentation, note materials on lesser cases and the secondary literature
were, from my perspective, all quite similar variations on a theme.
III. TRANSLATING THE PARTICIPATORY TEACHING
THEORY INTO PRACTICE
As much out of frustration as a desire to add one more constitu-
tional law text to a well-filled field, I assembled with the help of a
devoted former student, Deborah Creane (J.D. '95), and a host of
students whom she supervised, Constitutional Conflicts, a book intended
to support a participatory approach to teaching Constitutional Law. 3
I tried to de-emphasize the theoretical questions that so attract
constitutional scholars, but serve as impediments to the immediacy that
should characterize students' encounter with the Supreme Court's
decisions.
Constitutional Conflicts is in two parts. Part I is a hardback
volume of 550 pages and it divides the course into 31 chapters.
14
Each chapter contains a hypothetical case, followed by a list of
applicable case citations, and a summary review of the law. Part II
consists of two computer diskettes containing roughly eighteen hundred
13. DERRICK A. BELL JR., CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS (1997).
14. Id.
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edited or summarized Supreme Court decisions." These are intended
to be loaded on the students' computer hard drives. The cases can
then be read or printed out as needed to prepare for class. 6
Anderson Publishing published Constitutional Conflicts in May,
1997, and I used it in the Fall Semester of that year. The class
contained 103 students and met for three hours, twice a week for 14
weeks. 17  Except the first and the final class, one hypothetical case
was presented at each class and, in five days, we heard and decided
two cases. In preparation for the first class, students read all the
hypotheticals and filled out a form indicating their first, second, and
third choices for either advocate or chief justice. In the process, of
course, students peruse the text fairly carefully before making their
choices. At the first class, I reviewed the course structure and students
received a docket based on their selections. In addition, my two
teaching assistants, Lisa D'Agular (J.D. '98) and Beth Taylor, (L.L.M.
'99), presented a sample argument of the affirmative action case,
Taxman v. Board of Education of Piscataway.i"
15. Id.
16. This is somewhat inconvenient, but far easier than downloading and wading through
full opinions, or lugging around a five-pound casebook of edited opinions. Or, so I thought. I
underestimated the difficulties students would experience in the downloading process. The range
of computer hardware and software students own or have access to is quite wide and their level
of knowledge ranges from that of a computer programmer down to neophyte. Moreover, my idea
of organizing the cases in chronological rather than subject matter order, while a worthwhile
means of enabling students to view the cases in the context of the time of their decision, required
searching through several computer files to locate the cases on any particular subject matter.
In short, my initial attempt to utilize computer technology in the course left students begging
me to simply print out the cases so they could have them copied. Two students in the class,
David Cohen and Alexander Shapiro, came to my rescue volunteering to reorganize the cases by
subject matter and to place them on my web page in rich text format. Students could then
download them regardless of their computer or software. The complaints decreased after this, but
some students continued urging that I print out Volume II, despite the weight and cost. The
publisher finally did make Part II available in shrink-wrapped, printed pages.
17. Ideally, the course should be limited to 50 to 60 students to give students more
opportunity to take part in class discussion and to ease the task of reading and commenting on
student papers. I initially set a limit of 60 students, but when I learned that there were almost
90 students on the wait list, my proselytizing ego overcame my good judgment and I almost
doubled the class size. The system can work with a large class, but handling the sea of student
papers can be daunting.
18. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). The school board's
appeal challenged court findings that the board's retention of a black teacher to promote faculty
diversity over an equally qualified white teacher violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Id. While the issue directly involves statutory construction, recent decisions that greatly
alter the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause in race cases heavily influence that
construction. Certiori was dismissed when the case was settled. Piscataway Bd. of Educ. v.
Taxman, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997).
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Advocates and Chief Justices. Each student served either as an
advocate or a chief justice. The chief justice and the advocates for
each hypothetical served as a team for that hypothetical. Each
advocate briefed and argued one case. While styled briefs, they are
really "Points and Authorities," three or four page outlines of the
arguments and the authorities that support those arguments. Deborah
Creane served as an associate teacher for the course. She met with the
student groups and helped them focus on the issues and organize their
presentations. 9 Each argument was scheduled to last approximately
one hour. Each advocate (there were usually two for each side of the
case) was given five to ten minutes to summarize, rather than read, his
or her position in a conversational style. The advocates then respond-
ed to questions posed by the chief justice and the class serving as the
"court."
Op-ed Reflection. In addition to being prepared, present, and
participating in the argument of the cases, each student was asked to
prepare and submit a one to two-page, single-spaced "op-ed reflection"
for at least 15 of the 31 hypos. These essays, due on the class day
following the one in which the subject hypo case was presented, were
to be well written comments on the applicable law and policies
involved in the case. Like the op-ed pieces published in many
newspapers, they were to be short and to express a point of view with
support and consideration for that view, as well as to include reasons
for rejecting contrary views. Students were encouraged to bring a
unique or personal perspective to their writing, one they would not
mind having published in a daily paper.
Chief justices presided over the case arguments and initiated the
discussion by directing one question to each pair of advocates.
Following the argument, the chief justice reviewed the op-ed reflections
written for the case and prepared a five to six-page summary of the
views expressed for distribution to the class. The chief justices were
also responsible for writing a final exam question covering the subject
matter of the case presided over. Advocates provided assistance and
support in the exam-writing process. The thirty-one exam questions
were copied and distributed to each student in the class.
Final Exam. On the final class day, each student was given one
of the 31 exam questions prepared by the chief justices, except the one
they argued or wrote. Students had one hour to write an answer to the
19. In past years, students have done a good job writing their briefs and preparing their
arguments without much assistance, but both briefs and arguments clearly benefited this year
because the students were able to spend time with Ms. Creane.
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question, discussing applicable law and policy and suggesting an
approach designed to resolve the issues involved. At the end of the
hour, the exam answers were collected and redistributed to the team of
chief justice and advocates who wrote the question. These teams each
received and read the answers on three or four exams, and wrote
comments as well as a tentative grade: excellent, very good, O.K., or
inadequate.
Grades. As to final exams, I have always believed that much of
the learning potential in law school final exams is wasted on the
teacher. The real learning comes in writing the exam questions.
Indeed, it is impossible to write a decent question without a fairly good
knowledge of the material. Students studying to take exams written by
the teacher certainly hone their knowledge of the subject, but it is a
passive-defensive process (what is the s.o.b. going to hit us with?).
When, on the other hand, the student, working with others, writes an
exam question, he or she is actively involved in shaping the facts and
the issues. They are motivated to do their best in formulating a
question that some of their classmates must answer. They realize that
while they will grade the answers, their classmates will be judging
them as well. Taking responsibility for a job well-done can take
precedence over grades when we provide a structure that makes this
possible.
Students grading other students is seldom done at the law school
level. Competition for good grades, it is assumed, will overpower
honesty and integrity. That has not been my experience. Student
teams discuss seriously the relative merits of the answers they are
grading. Their comments are usually right on target and far more
detailed than students usually receive from even the most conscientious
teacher. In my overall grading, I usually comment on the comments,
but I seldom have to correct statements that are either wrong or
wrong-headed. They are also a bit astounded to find that they cannot
bring themselves to recommend an undeserved "A" for an exam paper:
they prepared the question, have an idea of what would comprise an
excellent response, and differentiate between better and worse with
sudden understanding that grading, while no science, is also not
entirely random.
NYU Law School has a "suggested grade curve" for upper-level
courses and I have had only limited success pointing out to school
administrators that my course is taught more like a seminar and it is
unfair to limit my students who are graded on a number of course
exercises on the same curve as courses where grades are based almost
entirely on one final exam. As a result, I live with a continuing and
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likely unresolvable tension between the effort to reward my students'
work and keep within hailing distance of the school's suggested grade
curve.
That tension is heightened by my desire to move away from the
"crap shoot" of final exam grades where students seldom know how
they have done until they receive their grades. I think students should
be able to determine their grades based on the amount and quality of
the work they do. Thus, for the Fall Semester, I told students at the
outset that those who performed at the "very good" level in completing
their briefs, arguments, 15 op-ed essays, and final exams, and who are
generally present, prepared, and participate in class discussion, would
be considered for a B+ grade. Those students who, in addition to
meeting the B+ requirements, submit op-ed reflections for at least 25
cases, would be considered for an A- grade. Those students who in
addition to meeting the requirements for an A- grade, submit a 12 to
15 page paper that builds on the comments in their hypo reflections to
reach conclusions and recommendations about the direction of
constitutional law, particularly its potential as an instrument of social
reform, or its propensity for protecting the status quo, would be
considered for an A grade.
I also promised to consider for an A level grade students who
devise a substitute hypo for one in the text that is more up-to-date and
better presents the relevant issues for discussion and argument. Many
of the hypos in the text are based on ideas submitted by students in
previous versions of this course. Consistently thoughtful and insightful
contributions to class discussions, and introduction of relevant outside
materials that enhance understanding of the subject matter, will also be
considered for grade enhancement. At the end of the course, I review
the files containing all the work each student has completed during the
course. I then write a memo to each student regarding the work and
assign a final grade. This is a lengthy and time-consuming process,
but it provides a level of feedback that students seldom receive during
their law school careers. As a dividend, the memoranda provide a
wealth of information, even years later, for letters of recommendation.
IV. CONCLUSION
The process I utilize in the classroom is a model rather than a
rigid formula. It can be altered to fit class size and student and teacher
inclination. The key is to replace a basically passive procedure,
consisting of assigned reading and lecture listening, with one requiring
active involvement, similar to the multiple aspects of practice, teaching,
and judicial functions. For all the pressures of the legal curriculum,
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students give every indication of welcoming responsibility, opportunity
and challenge. For myself, I find that I learn from my students' fresh
encounters with the Constitution, as we look at new questions and
question old answers. Potentially, such a procedure allows us to
approach the Paulo Freire ideal: that students become teachers and
teachers become learners.
I do not expect that Constitutional Conflicts, a text designed to
support a participatory learning approach, will become an immediate
best seller. The course procedure I use deviates rather severely from
a number of law school teaching norms. It does not assume that the
teacher is all-knowing and thus should occupy center stage in the
classroom. Rather, by decoupling several traditional aspects of legal
instruction, it frees the student to learn to analyze and perform
independently. The teacher can guide students through the preceden-
tial confusion, but primarily must impart, through experience, the
knowledge that each student is competent to do so. I find that this
guidance is most effective as the students seek to find their own way
through the thicket of conflicting rules and multiopinioned decisions.
As I teach Constitutional Law, students spend long hours
haggling over the facts in cases they are writing and practicing the
arguments that they must present before their peers. The quality of
case presentation varies, but my classes are far more exciting when
students are involved in this way then when I stand before them and
try to "convey the word" through lectures on subjects that do not
always evoke the desired questions and discussion. In fact, students
are far more ready to listen to my views after they have struggled with
their own cases. Certainly, whether they adopt or reject my positions,
they are deeply engaged: they have experienced the Constitution as a
living document, one with contested meaning, greatly influenced by
historical context, a vehicle capable of conveying and sustaining a
moral vision.
For most students-alas, not all-grades become a secondary
consideration to the benefits they gain from learning constitutional law
on a participatory basis. It is said of a great teacher that "he taught as
a learner, led as a follower, and so set the feet of many in the way of
life." That is quite a model. It moves me to close with the admission
that more important than teaching structure, technique, writing style
or jurisprudential philosophy, is the effort of all successful teachers
who succeed in communicating not only subject but self.
We all know that the memorable teachers in our lives hold that
status even though we do not recall a single thing they taught us.
Rather, we remember them as enviable individuals who spurred us to
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learn on our own, both the subject matter and ourselves. In the law
school curriculum, there are few courses that are better suited than
Constitutional Law as vehicles for the accomplishment of this
transference.
V. A FINAL WORD
My participatory learning method was put to a severe test when
midway through the semester, I was hospitalized for three weeks with
a severe case of pneumonia. As a result, I missed the final 10 class
sessions. In my absence, the class continued with my teaching
associate, Deborah Creane, serving my oversight role in keeping the
arguments on track and supervising the flow of briefs, op-eds, and final
exam questions. The students seemed to take a great deal of pride in
carrying on in my absence. Two NYU faculty members, Larry Sager
and Bert Neuborne, made guest appearances but, as I would have
done, injected comments and questions rather than lecture. It was not
a welcome but a very gratifying indication that, given an adequate
structure, students can teach one another.
Actually, this should not be a surprise. Law schools look to their
law reviews and other student publications as a major exemplar of their
intellectual strength. It is taken for granted that these publications will
be run by students who solicit or write the manuscripts, perform the
substantive and technical editing, and oversee production and
distribution tasks, all with little or no faculty input or supervision.
And students who serve on law reviews virtually always count their
labors as among their most rewarding law school experiences. The
challenge for teachers is to emulate in the classroom the law review
experience so that all students, rather than a selected few, can gain the
many benefits of participatory learning.
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